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Unemployment in Families: The Case of Housework
Unemployment has consequences for individu-
als, but its impacts also reverberate through fam-
ilies. This paper examines how families adapt to
unemployment in one area of life—time in house-
work. Using 74,881 observations from 10,390
couples in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics,
we estimate fixed effects models and find that
individuals spend between 3 and 7 hours more
per week in housework when unemployed than
when employed, with corresponding decreases
of 1 to 2 hours per week in the housework hours
of unemployed individuals’ spouses. We are the
first to show that unemployment is associated
both with a reallocation of housework to the
unemployed spouse and an increase in the fam-
ily’s total household production time. The results
also provide evidence for gender differences in
adjustments to the division of labor during unem-
ployment, with wives’ unemployment associated
with an increase in housework hours that is
double the increase for unemployed husbands.
Paid labor is an integral part of many Amer-
icans’ lives, and unemployment can have
a devastating effect on individuals’ financial
stability, career trajectories, and mental and
physical health (Burgard, Brand, & House,
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2007; Jacobson, LaLonde, & Sullivan, 1993).
Unemployment—the state of being not currently
employed, but seeking employment—is not lim-
ited to isolated individuals but also affects the
well-being and daily routines of families. For
example, job loss is associated with increased
probability of divorce (Charles & Stephens,
2004). For those who remain married, the experi-
ence of unemployment may alter specialization
decisions within the household. The question
of whether spouses (mostly wives) of individ-
uals who become unemployed increase their
labor supply (the ‘‘added-worker effect’’) has
been extensively studied and debated (Heckman
& MaCurdy, 1980; Lundberg, 1985; Maloney,
1987). Stephens (2002) found large increases
in wives’ labor supply following husbands’ job
losses, which in the long term compensated for
one fourth of their husbands’ lost income. But
the literature on changes in wives’ labor supply
in response to their husbands’ unemployment
has typically ignored changes in spouses’ time
in nonmarket productive activities following a
job loss. Just as changes in one spouse’s employ-
ment hours may affect the employment hours of
the other spouse, so too may job loss motivate the
unemployed spouse to increase household labor,
whereas the other spouse may decrease time in
household labor, particularly if she is employed.
The effects of unemployment on household
labor may not be limited to reallocation of tasks
from one spouse to another. In addition to chang-
ing who does housework, unemployment may
change the total amount of housework the couple
does. For example, unemployment is expected
to reduce the household’s financial resources,
which may reduce the outsourcing of housework
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and increase the household’s total housework
burden. In this paper we ask whether unemploy-
ment leads to both a rise in the couple’s total
time in housework and a shift of housework to
the unemployed spouse.
Furthermore, we hypothesize that responses
to unemployment will vary according to the
gender of the unemployed spouse. Time spent in
housework is a normative way in which women
‘‘do gender,’’ whereas men do gender through
housework avoidance (West & Zimmerman,
1987). Thus, we expect that while unemployed
a wife may pour additional time into house-
work, whereas an unemployed husband may be
reluctant to take on additional housework if he
believes that housework is the realm and respon-
sibility of his wife. This belief may be intensified
during periods of unemployment, if his inability
to fulfill the gendered, socially normative role
of breadwinner makes further deviation from
gender norms through participation in female-
typed tasks especially distasteful (Brines, 1994).
In this way, we hypothesize an interactive effect
between gender and time availability, with gen-
der affecting the ‘‘starting points’’ of employed
men’s and women’s housework time and the
degree to which they reallocate effort to domes-
tic labor in the face of a sudden reduction in paid
labor time.
We use data from the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics (PSID, 2009) and estimate the effect
of shifts into unemployment on both the real-
location of housework hours between spouses
and the amount of total household production.
The PSID is a uniquely appropriate data set for
answering this question because it has asked
household respondents to report the housework
hours of both the head of the household (by
default the husband for married couples) and his
wife for more than two decades. Thus, for many
members of the PSID sample, we have repeated
annual measures of both spouses’ housework
time and can estimate the changes in a couple’s
housework time that occur when either spouse
experiences unemployment.
LITERATURE REVIEW
The changes in spouses’ housework time that we
expect during periods of unemployment depend
on our prior assumptions about how spouses
make decisions about household labor. Job loss
provides husbands the potential to reduce their
working wives’ ‘‘second shift’’ (Hochschild,
1989) by assuming more housework and child
care responsibilities at home. Alternatively, hus-
bands may find increased time in homemaking
socially uncomfortable and undesirable, due to
gendered norms of behavior that define house-
work as women’s work. In the former situation,
spouses may be able to smoothly reallocate tasks
in the event of a husband’s job loss, but in the lat-
ter case husbands’ unemployment may increase
the burden on wives to participate in paid labor
without offering any relief from household labor.
These competing responses illustrate two of
the literature’s main theoretical perspectives on
housework division: time availability theory and
gender-based perspectives of household labor.
Time availability theory suggests that cou-
ples rationally allocate time in housework on
the basis of spouses’ relative hours in the paid
labor market and the amount of housework to be
done (Bianchi, Milkie, Sayer, & Robinson, 2000;
England & Farkas, 1986). Therefore, the spouse
with less time spent in paid labor is expected to
take on the greater responsibility for housework.
Past research into time availability has run into
a temporal ordering problem. By assuming that
couples allocate time in housework based on
their relative labor market hours, time availabil-
ity theory implicitly assumes that couples first
decide how to allocate each spouse’s time in
the paid labor market and then decide how to
allocate each spouse’s time in household labor
based on the number of hours each spends in
paid labor. Thus, it has been common in empir-
ical work to test time availability or to account
for time availability by including measures of
spouses’ market work time as an independent
variable in models of housework hours (Bianchi
et al., 2000; Bittman, England, Sayer, Folbre,
& Matheson, 2003; Brines, 1994; Evertsson &
Nermo, 2004; Greenstein, 2000). If housework
and labor force hours are jointly determined,
with gendered expectations about the allocation
of housework influencing spouses’ time in paid
labor, modeling time spent in housework in a
way that takes the labor force decision as given
may understate the effect of gender and over-
state the effect of time availability. Because of
the potential for joint determinacy, time in the
labor force is endogenous to time in housework.
The involuntary and sudden nature of job loss
allows us to address these shortcomings. In our
study, we can exploit the fact that job loss is
an exogenous shock to labor force hours and
examine how couples respond to this shock. The
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involuntary nature of job loss provides us with a
rare situation in which it is appropriate to view
labor market outcomes as determined prior to,
rather than jointly with, decisions about time in
household labor.
Along with altering the relative time avail-
ability of spouses, job loss changes their relative
earnings. The theory of relative resources sug-
gests that spouses allocate housework based on
the relative resources (monetary or otherwise)
each contributes to the family. The spouse con-
tributing the larger share of resources to the
family is expected to spend less time in house-
work than the spouse contributing the smaller
share, as the advantaged spouse is expected
to view housework as undesirable and to use
resources to bargain out of housework time
(Bittman et al., 2003; Brines, 1994; Evertsson &
Nermo, 2004). Thus, the relative resources the-
ory of housework division implies that job loss
will result in a shift of some additional house-
hold labor to the unemployed spouse, above and
beyond the effect of time availability, because
of this spouse’s loss of income.
The loss of income associated with unemploy-
ment may also affect housework time in absolute
terms. Given that wives’ earnings are negatively
associated with their own time in housework,
and that these reductions do not appear to be
offset by increases in husbands’ housework time
(Gupta, 2007), we expect that a wife’s unem-
ployment, in particular, will lead to an increase
in the couple’s total housework hours due to the
reduction in income. This earnings – housework
association may arise because wives’ earnings
are used to outsource housework. The positive
association between expenditures on market sub-
stitutes for wives’ own time in housework and
both total family income and wives’ earnings
(Cohen, 1998; Oropesa, 1993) is consistent with
this hypothesis and suggests that the loss of
income from unemployment may lead couples
to use their own labor to produce household
goods that they previously purchased.
Time availability and relative resources have
been criticized for ignoring the potential role
of gender in the allocation of housework tasks
within families. The ‘‘doing gender’’ perspec-
tive in the housework literature suggests that
housework is a space for the symbolic enact-
ment of gendered behavior (Berk, 1985; West &
Zimmerman, 1987). Cultural norms about which
spouse should dedicate time to the labor force
and which should dedicate time to domestic
labor (husband and wife, respectively) also influ-
ence individuals’ time in housework. These
norms may act as disincentives for couples
to adopt nontraditional divisions of household
labor, as couples may fear being stigmatized or
experience psychological unease (Atkinson &
Boles, 1984; Brines, 1994; Hochschild, 1989;
Tichenor, 2005).
For wives, unemployment leads to changes
in time availability that are compatible with
gendered norms of behavior, whereas for hus-
bands the predictions of time availability and
relative resources are at odds with norms of
behavior for men. Thus, we expect that gen-
der will condition and constrain the extent to
which individuals adjust their time in household
labor in response to unemployment, with greater
increases in housework time for unemployed
wives than unemployed husbands.
With the loss of the financial provider role for
unemployed husbands, it is possible that hus-
bands will resist housework even more strongly
than when they were employed, leading to
declines in husbands’ housework time when
they are unemployed. This is consistent with
the theory of gender display (Brines, 1994) and
its similar counterpart, gender deviance neutral-
ization (e.g., Greenstein, 2000), which suggests
that when the wife is the primary breadwinner
husbands will do less housework, and wives
more, than if the spouses had earnings parity:
Spouses compensate for nontraditional labor
force outcomes with a traditional division of
labor at home. Existing evidence on gender
display is mixed (Bittman et al., 2003; Brines,
1994; Evertsson & Nermo, 2004; Greenstein,
2000; Gupta, 2007; Killewald & Gough, 2010),
with critics having argued that it is wives’ own
earnings that determine their time in housework,
rather than wives’ earnings relative to those
of their husbands (Gupta, 2007; Killewald &
Gough). Unemployment provides a special case
in which to examine couples’ responses to a
female breadwinner and, as a result, our study
provides a test of whether the predictions of
gender display hold in the context of unemploy-
ment. Brines (1994) is one of the few researchers
to examine this case with unemployed hus-
bands; she found that recently unemployed
husbands spent more time in housework than
fully employed husbands, but long-term unem-
ployed husbands spent no more, and perhaps
less, time in housework than fully employed
husbands. She suggested that these long-term
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unemployed husbands resisted housework in
response to their dependency on their wives.
Although Brines (1994) found resistance to
housework among unemployed husbands, other
researchers have not found these differences.
Burda and Hamermesh (2010), using cross-
sectional data from the American Time Use
Survey, estimated that unemployed men and
women spent about 10.5 more hours per week in
household production than employed men and
women. A weakness of this study, however, is
that if the unemployed are different from others
in ways that are correlated with housework time
but not observed in the data, such as in their
gender ideology or health, these results may be
biased.
Two studies have used short longitudinal data
sets to examine the relationship between unem-
ployment and housework. Shamir (1986) studied
a small sample of Israelis who had registered as
unemployed with the Employment Service of the
Israeli Ministry of Labor and Welfare and their
spouses. He found that both men and women
who became unemployed increased their share
of household tasks modestly during the period
of unemployment and then reduced their share
of household tasks following re-employment.
More recently, Ström (2002) studied Swedish
couples using the Swedish Longitudinal Study
among the Unemployed and the Swedish Level
of Living survey. She found that men who
were unemployed at the first wave had higher
housework hours at the second wave than con-
tinuously employed men, even if they had been
re-employed by the second wave. Women who
were unemployed at the first wave spent more
time in housework than continuously employed
women at the second wave, but there were no
significant differences if the women had been
re-employed by the second wave (Ström).
THE PRESENT STUDY
Our work contributes to the literature in four
ways. First, we employ fixed effects models,
which allow us to examine how the house-
work hours of both spouses differ during periods
of unemployment from those during periods
of employment. These models net out time-
invariant differences, so results are unbiased
even in the case of unobserved time-invariant
characteristics of individuals that are correlated
with both their likelihood of unemployment and
their housework time. Previous panel studies
of the relationship between unemployment and
housework time have been limited by small
sample sizes and short durations of the panels.
Second, we note that the existing panel studies
of couples’ housework responses to unemploy-
ment come from countries other than the United
States. Given evidence of significant cross-
national variation in the division of household
labor (Cooke, 2010; Gupta, Evertsson, Grunow,
Nermo, & Sayer, 2010; Sayer, 2010; van der
Lippe, 2010), rates of female labor force partic-
ipation and hours worked by women (van der
Lippe), rates of unemployment, and unemploy-
ment benefits (Baker, Glyn, Howell, & Schmitt,
2005), it is unclear whether the results would
translate directly to the United States. Thus, we
contribute to the literature by estimating the rela-
tionship between unemployment and housework
hours specifically within the United States.
Our third contribution is our most signifi-
cant. Unlike most past research, we specifically
consider the family context in which both unem-
ployment and housework occur. In doing so, we
look at the housework time of both the individ-
ual who becomes unemployed and his spouse.
In this way, we are able to test whether changes
in housework time result primarily from a real-
location of housework between spouses or from
a change in the total amount of housework the
couple performs. Unemployment reduces the
opportunity cost of housework, as time spent in
housework does not come at the cost of foregone
time in paid labor. Additionally, unemployment
lowers household income, reducing the family’s
ability to outsource household labor. Thus, we
expect that the total time spent in household
labor will rise for households with an unem-
ployed spouse. Furthermore, the unemployment
of one spouse alters the relative labor force com-
mitments of spouses, as well as their relative
bargaining positions, both of which should tend
to shift household production to the unemployed
individual and away from his spouse. We expect
to see both reallocation of housework time
toward the unemployed spouse, consistent with
the time availability and resource-based theories,
and increases in total household production. Our
study is unique in considering changes in total
household production as well as substitution of
one spouse’s time for another.
Although we expect to see both reallocation
of housework and increases in household pro-
duction, we acknowledge that couples’ accus-
tomed division of labor may have ‘‘stickiness’’:
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Couples may change their division of house-
work less than would be expected on the basis
of purely economic motives. Either because of
gender norms, because spouses have developed
routines and patterns of housework that require
effort to renegotiate, or because spouses have
developed task-specific skills that make reallo-
cation of housework difficult, we expect changes
in spouses’ household labor time during periods
of unemployment to be moderate in size.
Furthermore, again acknowledging the impor-
tance of examining unemployment and house-
work in the context of total family decisions,
we expect that changes in spouses’ housework
hours will vary according to the family employ-
ment context in which they occur, a possibility
ignored in previous research. Given that much
of the research on housework has focused on the
role of spouses’ relative endowments of time and
resources in shaping the allocation of household
labor, this neglect is puzzling. We expect that
when the spouse of an unemployed individual
is heavily committed to the labor force, couples
will have a greater incentive to shift housework
to the unemployed spouse in order to reduce
the disparity between spouses in total work
hours (paid labor plus household labor). In other
words, the response of a partnered individual to
his job loss will not be purely individual, but
will depend on what makes sense in the context
of the couple’s joint decisions about employ-
ment and housework. Specifically, we examine
how husbands’ responses to unemployment in
housework time vary by the employment status
of their wives.
Finally, we contribute to the literature by
testing the extent to which gender conditions
time availability, either by further boosting the
increase in housework time for unemployed
wives or by attenuating the increase expected
because of time availability for unemployed
husbands. In particular, we can examine whether
there is evidence for compensatory gender
display in the face of unemployment as Brines
(1994) found using cross-sectional models.
METHOD
We use data from the 1979 – 2007 waves of the
PSID. The PSID is a longitudinal study con-
ducted by the University of Michigan that began
in 1968 with a sample of 4,800 American house-
holds. It has since reinterviewed members of
those original households and their descendants
annually or biannually (beginning in 1997). Our
period of study begins in 1979 because it was
the first year that the PSID collected reports of
both spouses’ employment statuses. The panel
nature of the PSID makes it an ideal data set
for evaluating how couples change their time
spent in household labor in response to changes
in their labor force participation and rewards.
We restrict the sample to married and long-
term (1 or more years) cohabiting couples, with
both partners present in the household, censoring
them once one partner is over the age of 60
so that we avoid including couples who are
approaching the normative age of retirement. We
exclude couples who have been cohabiting for
shorter periods of time because in these cases the
PSID does not collect housework hours for both
partners. For simplicity, we refer to all partners
as ‘‘spouses,’’ ‘‘husbands,’’ and ‘‘wives,’’ even
though some are not married. Responses to
survey questions are provided by the household
member who is better able to answer the array
of questions on financial and other matters in the
study (Achen & Stafford, 2005). The percentage
of respondents who are wives increases over the
period of study to about 50%.
We estimate match-specific individual-level
fixed effects models, which allow us to con-
trol for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity
in housework hours that may be correlated
with unemployment status. By match-specific
we mean that fixed effects for the individual are
fixed only within the context of one specific cou-
ple, and we treat subsequent marriages as sepa-
rate observations. As a result, our estimates of the
relationship between unemployment and house-
work hours are identified based on the difference
between average housework hours during spells
of unemployment and average housework hours
during periods of employment, net of other con-
trols, for those who are employed in at least one
year and unemployed in at least one year. Under
the fixed effects framework, we assume that indi-
viduals’ (i) housework hours (hswk) across time
(t) can be modeled as a function of time-varying
predictors (X), individual-level match-specific
fixed effects (α), and time-varying individual-
level variation (ε), as follows:
hswkit = X′it β + αi + εit
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Dependent Variables
We use two dependent variables: the weekly
housework hours of the husband and those of
the wife. The question reads, ‘‘About how much
time do you spend on housework in an aver-
age week? I mean time spent cooking, cleaning,
and doing other work around the house.’’ For
the question about the spouse, ‘‘do you’’ is
replaced with ‘‘does she’’ or ‘‘does he.’’ Time
in direct child care is not explicitly included in
this measure, although it is possible that some
respondents included time in child care when
giving their answers. We recode values above
the 99th percentile to take the value of the 99th
percentile to guard against outliers that would
unduly influence the results. Absolute time spent
in housework is frequently used as the dependent
variable in studies of household labor, including
for married couples (Baxter, Hewitt, & Haynes,
2008; Bianchi et al., 2000; Bittman et al., 2003;
Brines, 1994; Gupta, 1999, 2007). Alternatively,
for those primarily interested in questions of the
allocation of housework time between partners,
the share of total housework done by each spouse
may be more appropriate (Coltrane & Ishii-
Kuntz, 1992; Gershuny, Bittman, & Brice, 2005;
Greenstein, 2000; Shamir, 1986). In our work,
it is most appropriate to use absolute housework
time, as we wish to highlight the effects of unem-
ployment on the total amount of time the couple
spends in housework as well as the allocation
between spouses. We present results of models
of the share of housework done by each spouse
in the ‘‘Alternative Specifications’’ section.
Stylized questions about the number of hours
spent in housework, such as the question
employed in the PSID, consistently yield higher
estimates of time in housework than time diary
measures (Juster, Ono, & Stafford, 2003). Yet,
such single summary measures may be less sus-
ceptible to double counting than measures asking
about time spent in specific tasks, given that
many respondents multitask (Geist, 2010). Will
measurement error bias our results? First, we
note that any consistent upward bias in house-
work time by a given couple—even if the amount
of bias varies across couples—will be absorbed
by the fixed effects. Thus, if all respondents
overestimate, and some respondents overesti-
mate more than others, the coefficients will
remain unaffected, provided that the extent of
overestimation is constant for any given cou-
ple. Even if there is variation across years in
the extent of overestimation by a couple, if the
measurement error is classical the coefficients
will remain unbiased. Thus, the coefficients will
only be biased if the measurement error in the
reports of housework time is correlated with the
time-varying component of employment status.
For example, if individuals truly experience no
change in housework time when they become
unemployed, but those who are unemployed
want to appear productive during their unem-
ployment spell, they may overreport housework
time more than they did when employed. In this
case, our coefficients would be biased upward.
Independent Variables
In our first model, we estimate the average
change in spouses’ housework hours associated
with transitions to unemployment for either
spouse. Two dummy variables for employment
are created. The first is set to 1 if the husband
reports being unemployed at the time of the
survey, and the second is set to 1 if the
wife reports being unemployed at the time of
the survey. Thus, both husbands’ and wives’
housework hours are allowed to vary with
changes in the employment status of either
spouse. In this model, we aggregate together
the experiences of all unemployed persons of
the same gender, assuming that the relationship
between unemployment and housework does
not vary with the employment status of the
unemployed individual’s spouse.
Our second model relaxes this assumption. In
this model, the dummy variable for the hus-
band’s unemployment is interacted with the
employment status of his wife in the year prior
to the start of the current unemployment spell.
Wives may be homemakers, part-time workers
(less than 35 hours per week but more than 0), or
full-time workers (at least 35 hours per week) in
the year prior to the husband’s job loss. We retain
controls for other groups, such as unemployed
wives, but do not allow separate interactions of
these groups with the unemployment status of
the husband. We do not interact the variable for
the wife’s unemployment with the employment
status of the husband in the year prior to the
beginning of her unemployment spell because
the sample of husbands working less than full
time is small and highly selective.
Because our primary interest is in comparing
housework time during periods of unemploy-
ment to periods of employment, we construct
a series of dummy variables for whether either
Unemployment and Housework in Families 1091
spouse is a student or out of the labor force,
where the latter category includes those who
report keeping house and those who report
that they are retired at the time of the survey.
Employment is the omitted category. We are
particularly concerned with estimating the effect
of being involuntarily unemployed on spouses’
housework time, as it is in this case that nonem-
ployment can be viewed as an exogenous shock
to individuals’ time in paid labor.
Control Variables
In both models, we control for the same set
of time-varying covariates that may be corre-
lated with both unemployment and the amount
of housework each spouse performs, but may
be plausibly treated as exogenous to unemploy-
ment. Because the presence of children in the
household is associated with increases in house-
work time, particularly for women (Baxter et al.,
2008; Bianchi et al., 2000; Sanchez & Thomson,
1997), we control for the presence of at least one,
at least two, and at least three children in the
household, using individual indicator variables,
as well as the age of the youngest child. We also
include a linear measure of the year, to account
for secular trends in spouses’ housework time.
We control for the state-level annual unemploy-
ment rate for the respondent’s state of residence,
as locally poor labor market conditions may
affect spouses’ decisions about household labor
(Burda & Hamermesh, 2010). We control for
whether the family owns the home in which they
reside, as homeowners may have a larger amount
of housework to be completed than nonhome-
owners and may also have greater incentives
to maintain their homes. Finally, we include a
dummy variable to indicate whether the husband
or wife provided the PSID interview, as previ-
ous research has shown that in the PSID married
men report about 3 hours per week more time in
core housework tasks than their wives report for
them, although husbands and wives report sim-
ilar levels of housework time for wives (Achen
& Stafford, 2005).
We do not control for time-varying covariates
that are potentially endogenous with unemploy-
ment, such as family income or mental health.
As such, our results estimate the total aver-
age change in housework time resulting from
unemployment, rather than the residual change
that remains after controlling for possible causal
pathways that link unemployment to housework.
For example, households are likely to have a
lower family income when one spouse is unem-
ployed than when both spouses are employed.
Lower family income is expected to reduce the
extent to which the household outsources domes-
tic labor (through dining out or hiring a domestic
worker). Reduced outsourcing is then expected
to be associated with increased housework time
for the couple. Controlling for family income in
the regression will effectively net out any of the
association between unemployment and house-
work that operates through reduced household
income. Thus, it does not estimate the average
real change in housework time experienced by
couples with an unemployed spouse.
Although we include time-invariant variables
such as race and education in the descriptive
statistics, we do not include these variables in the
fixed effects models, as time-invariant variables
do not contribute to the fixed effects estimation,
which capitalizes on within-couple changes
over time. In order to examine variation by
these characteristics, we conduct supplemental
analyses based on the main models, as described
in the ‘‘Alternative Specifications’’ section.
We weight the data according to the year-
specific PSID household-level weights, which
have been rescaled so that they average one in
each year. Our sample includes both the Latino
sample (1990 – 1995) and the immigrant sam-
ple (1997 – 2007) in the years in which they
were included in the PSID sample, and the
weights reflect this. For fixed effects models, it
is necessary to assign each couple a single, time-
invariant weight. Arbitrarily, we assign the cou-
ple their household sample weight from the first
year in which they appear in the sample, although
results using the sample weight from the last year
in which the couple appears are similar.
We drop observations with missing values
on the dependent variable (1,342 observations;
1.5%), observations for which the respondent’s
employment status is unknown (325 observa-
tions, 0.4%), and observations in which the
respondent resides outside of the 50 states or
the state of residence is unknown and, therefore,
their state-level unemployment rate cannot be
assigned (2,261 observations; 2.6%). We require
information about the employment hours of the
unemployed individual’s spouse in the year prior
to unemployment, so we drop observations in
which respondents are unemployed during the
first year in which they are observed (5,834
observations deleted; 6.7%). Finally, we drop all
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observations for which the current year-specific
weight (986 observations; 1.1%) or the longitu-
dinal weight (1,141 observations; 1.3%) is equal
to zero. Observations with zero weight pertain
to households that were nonrespondents in the
current wave of data collection but had valid
responses in other years or were recontacted after
a period of nonresponse (Gouskova, Heeringa,
McGonagle, Schoeni, & Stafford, 2008). This
leaves us with 74,881 observations on 10,390
couples, who were observed 7.2 times each on
average.
RESULTS
The data in our sample span the period
1979 – 2007. Descriptive statistics for three
periods are shown in Table 1: 1979 – 1985,
1986 – 1992, and 1993 – 2007. The average age
of husbands in the early period was 40.0 years,
and increased to 41.8 in the late period. The
corresponding ages for wives were 37.5 years
in the early period and 39.8 in the late period.
Median annual earnings for husbands (in 2009
dollars) declined across the period from $50,190
in the early period to $47,265 in the late
period, consistent with stagnating men’s wages
during this period (Morris & Western, 1999).
Conversely, median annual earnings for wives
more than doubled from $10,300 in the early
period to $21,750 in the late period, reflecting in
part increases in married women’s employment,
as evidenced by the increase in wives’ hours in
paid labor across the period, from an average
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
1979 – 1985 1986 – 1992 1993 – 2007
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Range
Median husband earnings $50,190 $47,221 $48,569 $62,832 $47,265 $82,928 $0 – $339,200
Median wife earnings $10,300 $18,111 $15,617 $22,441 $21,750 $30,702 $0 – $96,000
Wife weekly work hours 19.35 16.85 23.67 17.00 26.06 17.11 0 – 60
Husband housework hours 6.40 6.82 7.16 6.94 7.01 6.72 0 – 35
Wife housework hours 26.95 16.01 22.48 14.38 19.13 13.15 0 – 80
Husband age 40.00 10.90 40.54 10.13 41.83 9.87 16 – 60
Wife age 37.53 10.58 38.21 9.83 39.81 9.70 15 – 60
Wife is respondent 0.20 0.35 0.50 0 – 1
Husband is respondent 0.80 0.65 0.49 0 – 1
Blacka 0.07 0.07 0.07 0 – 1
Latinob 0.03 0.05 0.06 0 – 1
Immigrantc 0.03 0.03 0.07 0 – 1
Husband college degreed 0.27 0.27 0.32 0 – 1
Wife college degreee 0.19 0.21 0.27 0 – 1
Own home 0.79 0.77 0.79 0 – 1
Rent home 0.19 0.20 0.19 0 – 1
Husband unemployedf 0.02 0.02 0.02 0 – 1
Wife unemployedg 0.01 0.02 0.02 0 – 1
Husband total losses 1.25 0.59 1.47 0.93 1.49 1.08 1 – 12
Wife total losses 1.09 0.31 1.19 0.46 1.24 1.08 1 – 5
Husband keeping househ 0.02 0.03 0.03 0 – 1
Wife keeping housei 0.37 0.26 0.22 0 – 1
Husband is student 0.01 0.01 0.01 0 – 1
Wife is student 0.01 0.01 0.01 0 – 1
Note: All values are weighted. N = 10,390.
aBlack: 0 = non-Black husband, 1 = Black husband. bLatino: 0 = non-Latino husband, 1 = Latino husband. cImmigrant: 0
= nonimmigrant husband, 1 = immigrant husband. dHusband college degree: 0 = no college degree, 1 = college degree. eWife
college degree: 0 = no college degree, 1 = college degree. f Husband unemployed: 0 = not unemployed, 1 = unemployed.
gWife unemployed: 0 = not unemployed, 1 = unemployed. hHusband keeping house: 0 = not keeping house, 1 = keeping
house. iWife keeping house: 0 = not keeping house, 1 = keeping house.
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of 19.4 hours per week in the early period to
26.1 hours per week in the late period.
About 7% of families in the sample included
a Black husband. Because the PSID asked only
about the race of the head of the household prior
to 1985 (and, for married couples, the head of
the household is the husband by default), we
used only the husband’s racial identification.
The percentage of families in the sample that
included a Latino husband rose from 3% in the
early period to 6% in the late period. A similar
rise was seen for the percentage of families with
a husband who was an immigrant—from 3%
to 7% across the periods. The percentage of
respondents holding college degrees increased
over the period, from 27% of husbands in
the early period to 32% of husbands in the
late period, and from 19% to 27% for wives.
About 80% of respondents owned the home
in which they resided, with the majority of the
remaining respondents living in rental dwellings.
The percentage of respondents who are wives
rose over the period from 20% in the early period
to 50% in the late period, whereas the percent
who are husbands declined over the period from
80% in the early period to 49% in the late
period.
The trends in wives’ average time in
housework observed in this sample followed
trends documented elsewhere (Bianchi et al.,
2000; Gershuny & Robinson, 1988), declining
from 27.0 hours per week in the early period to
19.1 in the late period. Yet, we found far less
change in husbands’ housework hours across
the period, which averaged between 6.4 and
7.2 hours per week in each period. Others have
documented a rise in men’s housework time
(Bianchi et al., 2000; Gershuny & Robinson,
1988; Juster et al., 2003), although some found
a leveling out around 1990 (Bianchi et al.; Juster
et al.). The small increase we did see over the
period of study is consistent with the results
from Juster and colleagues for the same time
period and using the same data set. Averaged
across all years in the sample, for husbands the
distribution of the housework hours variable is
such that the 25th percentile was 2 hours per
week and the 75th percentile was 10 hours per
week. The corresponding values for wives were
10 hours per week at the 25th percentile and
30 hours per week at the 75th percentile. Thus,
three quarters of wives did as much or more
housework than the three quarters of husbands
who did the least housework.
On average, 2% of husbands and 1% – 2%
of wives were unemployed at the time of the
survey over the three periods. Among those
who experienced unemployment in at least one
period, the average number of survey waves in
which they were observed to be unemployed
was slightly higher for husbands than wives,
ranging between 1.3 and 1.5 for husbands and
between 1.1 and 1.2 for wives. On average
2% – 3% of husbands were keeping house or
retired at the time of the survey over the three
periods. Consistent with rising female labor
force participation rates, the percentage of wives
keeping house or retired dropped from 37% in
the early period to 22% in the late period. In all
years, approximately 1% of both husbands and
wives were students at the time of the survey.
The results for the aggregate model are pre-
sented in Table 2. In the aggregate model, hus-
bands spent an average of 3.2 hours (p < .001)
per week more in housework when they were
Table 2. Summary of Fixed Effects Analysis for Variables
Predicting Husband’s and Wife’s Housework Hours
Husbands Wives
Variable b SE b SE
Husband’s
unemployment
3.19∗∗∗ .25 −1.29∗∗ .38
Wife’s unemployment −1.55∗∗∗ .23 6.39∗∗∗ .46
Husband keeping
house
3.91∗∗∗ .36 −2.42∗∗∗ .45
Wife keeping house −1.59∗∗∗ .10 9.71∗∗∗ .22
1+ children 1.36∗∗∗ .13 6.05∗∗∗ .25
2+ children 0.07 .10 1.96∗∗∗ .19
3+ children 0.04 .15 2.17∗∗∗ .29




Respondent is wife N/A −0.98∗∗∗ .23
Year 0.04∗∗∗ .01 −0.14∗∗∗ .01
State unemployment
rate
−0.02 .02 0.04 .04
Rent home −0.83∗∗∗ .12 −1.22∗∗∗ .20
Constant 5.20∗∗∗ .24 18.12∗∗∗ .38




Note: Year centered on 1978. Models also control for
student status of husbands and wives. All values are
weighted. N = 10,390.
∗∗p < .01. ∗∗∗p < .001.
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unemployed as opposed to employed, whereas
they spent an average of 1.6 fewer hours
(p < .001) per week in housework when their
wife was unemployed than when she was
employed. In the aggregate model for wives’
housework hours, wives spent an average of 1.3
fewer hours (p < .01) per week in housework
when their husband was unemployed than when
he was employed, but they spent an average of
6.4 hours more per week (p < .001) in house-
work when they were unemployed than when
they were employed.
Thus, consistent with the predictions of
the time availability and relative resources
perspectives, for both spouses unemployment
increased housework time for the unemployed
spouse compared to periods of employment
and decreased housework for the other spouse.
Furthermore, there was evidence of gender
asymmetry in the responses of spouses to the
experience of unemployment: Both husbands
and wives increased their housework time if they
became unemployed, but the increase for wives
was twice as large. The reduction in housework
hours of 1 to 2 hours per week experienced by
the spouse of the unemployed individual was
similar for both husbands and wives. Regardless
of which spouse became unemployed, the total
time in housework by couples increased during
unemployment, consistent with our expectation
that unemployment will reduce the opportunity
cost of housework and the ability to pay for
housework substitutes.
Turning to the covariates in our fixed effects
models of husbands’ housework time, a first
child was associated with an increase of
1.4 hours (p < .001) per week in housework,
and with each year the youngest child grew older
there was a decline of about 0.1 hours (6 minutes;
p < .001) per week in housework. Husbands’
reported housework hours were an average of
2.1 hours (p < .001) per week higher in the peri-
ods in which they reported their own housework
time, indicating that husbands reported signif-
icantly more housework time for themselves
than did other members of the household. This
was consistent with previous work on report-
ing of housework hours in the PSID (Achen
& Stafford, 2005). Husbands’ housework time
increased yearly by about 0.04 hours (2 minutes;
p < .001) per week. Thus, although husbands’
housework hours have risen over time, the
change was slight. Changes in the annual state-
level unemployment rate were not significantly
associated with changes in husbands’ housework
time. Finally, renters spent about 0.8 hours (48
minutes; p < .001) per week less in housework
than homeowners.
In the fixed effects model of wives’ house-
work time, it was clear that children had a
substantial effect on wives’ housework hours.
A first child was associated with a 6.1-hour
(p < .001) increase in weekly housework hours,
whereas a second child was associated with an
additional 2.0-hour (p < .001) increase, and a
third or higher-order birth was associated with an
additional 2.2-hour (p < .001) increase. Wives’
housework time declined by about 0.3 hours per
week (18 minutes; p < .001) with each year
the youngest child aged. Although both spouses
spent more time in housework when children
were present in the household, the effects were
substantially larger for wives than for husbands.
If the wife was the respondent she reported about
1.0 hour less housework per week than if another
member of the household was the respondent.
Interestingly, these results do not imply that each
spouse overreported his own time in housework
compared to the reports of other household mem-
bers. Instead, it suggests that husbands reported
more time in housework for both themselves and
their wives than their wives reported. With each
passing year, wives’ housework time declined
by 0.14 hours (8 minutes; p < .001) per week.
Consistent with the results in Table 1, changes
across time in wives’ housework hours have
been larger than changes in husbands’ house-
work hours. As in the model of husbands’ time,
the state-level unemployment rate was not asso-
ciated with wives’ housework hours. Wives in
families that rented their dwellings spent about
1.2 hours (p < .001) per week less in housework
than those in families that owned their homes,
also consistent with the results for husbands.
The results also indicated large differences
between changes in housework time during
unemployment and changes during periods of
being voluntarily out of the labor force, par-
ticularly for wives. In the model of husbands’
housework hours, his being voluntarily out of the
labor force was associated with 3.9 more hours
of housework per week (p < .001) than when he
was employed and 2.4 fewer hours per week in
his wife’s housework time (p < .001). Recall,
for comparison, that a husband’s unemployment
was associated with 3.2 hours per week more
of his housework time and 1.3 fewer hours per
week in his wife’s housework time than during
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periods in which he was employed. Thus, the
changes associated with being voluntarily absent
from the labor force were slightly larger than for
unemployment. This effect was magnified in the
results for wives’ time. When wives were vol-
untarily out of the labor force, their housework
hours were an average of 9.7 (p < .001) hours
more per week than in periods when they were
employed, compared to 6.4 hours more per week
when they were unemployed. Given that neither
group is working, what might explain this differ-
ence? First, wives who were voluntarily out of
the labor force may have had more time available
for housework than wives who were unem-
ployed, if unemployed wives were spending
some of their time seeking employment. Second,
it is possible that some wives who voluntarily
exited the labor force were motivated in part by
a desire to increase household production (see
e.g., Hochschild, 1989; Stone & Lovejoy, 2004).
When wives were voluntarily out of the labor
force, their husbands’ housework hours were an
average of 1.6 hours per week (p < .001) lower
than during periods in which she was employed,
similar to when she was unemployed.
Interactions by Wives’ Employment Status
Table 3 shows the results for the models
that interact the husband’s job loss with
the wife’s employment status in the year
prior to his transition to unemployment. Our
findings are consistent with the results from the
aggregate model but bring the family context of
unemployment and housework to the forefront.
Husbands who were unemployed had the largest
increases in housework time, as compared to
when they were employed, if their wives worked
full time (3.9 hours; p < .001) and the smallest
increases when their wives were homemakers
(2.2 hours; p < .001). In terms of changes
in husbands’ housework hours, unemployed
husbands whose wives worked part time fall
in between, although we cannot reject the null
hypothesis that the husband’s increase was
the same as if the wife worked full time,
F(1, 10389) = 1.87; p = .17. In some sense,
these results are surprising, as homemakers
have, on average, the highest household labor
burden and therefore the greatest potential for
reduction during periods of their husbands’
unemployment. But couples with a traditional
division of labor may be least likely to
perceive increased household responsibility by
the husband as an appropriate response to his
job loss. The results suggest that the division of
household labor responded to the relative market
work commitments of each spouse: Unemployed
husbands were more likely to take over
household tasks for their wives when the wife’s
time was highly committed to the labor force.
Wives who worked part time saw a statisti-
cally significant 2.0-hour per week (p < .001)
reduction in housework hours during periods of
Table 3. Selected Coefficients of Fixed Effects Analysis Predicting Housework Hours With Interactions for Wife Work
Hours—Husbands, Wives
Interactions by Wife’s Work Hours
Husbands Wives
Variable b SE b SE
Husband’s unemployment/wife homemaker 2.18∗∗∗ 0.49 −0.50 0.94
Husband’s unemployment/wife PT 3.17∗∗∗ 0.37 −1.98∗∗∗ 0.55
Husband’s unemployment/wife FT 3.91∗∗∗ 0.40 −1.03∗ 0.49
Wife’s unemployment −1.55∗∗∗ 0.23 6.37∗∗∗ 0.46
Husband keeping house 3.92∗∗∗ 0.36 −2.42∗∗∗ 0.45
Wife keeping house −1.59∗∗∗ 0.10 9.71∗∗∗ 0.22
Constant 5.20∗∗∗ 0.24 18.12∗∗∗ 0.38
R2 overall 0.06 0.26
Variance explained by fixed effects 0.50 0.52
Note: Year centered on 1978. Models also control for student status of husbands and wives. All values are weighted.
N = 10,390.
PT = engaged in part-time work. FT = engaged in full-time work.
∗p < .05. ∗∗∗p < .001.
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husbands’ unemployment, which was larger in
magnitude than the reduction for either home-
makers (0.50 hours) or wives working full time
(1.0 hours; p < .05), although we cannot reject
the null hypothesis that it is equivalent to the
reduction seen by wives working full time,
F(1, 10389) = 1.73; p = .19. It is possible that
wives who worked part time decreased their
housework time to a greater extent because they
expected to increase their time in market work,
which may not have been an option for wives
already working full time.
Alternative Specifications
In order to examine whether there was het-
erogeneity underlying the results presented in
the previous section, we performed subgroup
analyses as well as a model with an alterna-
tive specification of the dependent variable. For
simplicity, we confined our alternative specifi-
cations to the aggregate model.
First, we checked the consistency of our
results for various subgroups: Black versus
non-Black, Latino versus non-Latino, immi-
grant versus nonimmigrant, college degree
versus no college degree, parents versus nonpar-
ents, cohabiters versus married couples (overall
and only in years when they can be sepa-
rately identified, i.e., post-1982), and by time
period (1979 – 1985, 1986 – 1992, 1993 – 2007).
In each case, we tested whether the three
principal conclusions of our main analysis
held: (a) that individuals’ housework hours rose
during unemployment, whereas their spouses’
housework hours fell; (b) that the total time
spent in household production increased dur-
ing unemployment; and (c) that unemployed
wives increased their housework hours more
than unemployed husbands. All three conclu-
sions held for all subsamples as well as the
main sample, with three exceptions for conclu-
sion (b): for cohabiters, for Latinos, and for
immigrants. In the case of the female partner’s
unemployment, for all three of these groups,
couples also experienced an increase in total
household production, but in the case of the male
partner’s unemployment, couples experienced a
small decrease in total household production as
female partners reduced their time in housework
more than their unemployed partners increased
their time in housework. This may indicate real
differences in the responses of these subgroups
to unemployment, although we are cautious in
drawing conclusions from the relatively small
numbers of unemployment spells observed in
these groups (between 100 and 250 spells of
unemployment for each gender within each sub-
group). Future research, either qualitative or
quantitative, may wish to explore variation by
ethnicity and marital status in couples’ house-
hold labor responses to unemployment.
Finally, although we believe absolute hours
are more informative as a dependent variable for
our research question because they allow us to
identify changes in total household production
along with changes in housework allocation, we
estimated models using the share of housework
hours completed by each spouse as the dependent
variable. This allowed us to more closely test the
deviance neutralization hypothesis as defined by
Greenstein (2000) because the hypothesis rests
on a relative measure of housework division.
The patterns were consistent with our previous
results in both sign and statistical significance,
suggesting a lack of evidence for deviance neu-
tralization: Spouses who became unemployed
increased the share of the total housework they
performed, regardless of their gender.
Limitations
As discussed in the Method section under
‘‘Dependent Variables,’’ the stylized measure
used in the PSID to report time in housework
likely resulted in a slight overestimate of time in
housework, although, for the reasons previously
discussed, this will only lead to biased coefficient
estimates in certain circumstances.
A second limitation related to the housework
measure available in the PSID is that it empha-
sizes time in female-typed tasks. Therefore, we
may have underestimated husbands’ increases in
housework time if they substantially increased
their time in male-typed tasks such as yard
work and home and vehicle maintenance. Esti-
mates from the National Survey of Families and
Households indicated that married men spent
about 40% of their total household labor time
in these male-typed tasks (yard and household
maintenance and auto maintenance), compared
to only 6% for married women (Noonan, 2001).
The gender differences we observed in hus-
bands’ and wives’ responses to unemployment
might have resulted from men increasing their
time in male-typed household responsibilities,
which are underreported in the PSID. In the
most extreme form, gender norms might not
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affect the amount of time that unemployed hus-
bands and wives add to their household labor
responsibilities, but would greatly affect the type
of work.
Because we are concerned with capturing
measures of housework time during periods
of unemployment and the housework data
are collected only once per survey wave,
we have limited our study to examine only
unemployment at the time of the survey. In
this way, labor force status and housework time
were measured concurrently. This means that
we did not observe the relationship between
unemployment and housework for all spells of
unemployment, only for those that were ongoing
at the time of the PSID interview. This was a
necessary limitation, as we did not know the
housework time during unemployment for those
whose unemployment spells fell between survey
waves.
Finally, the data did not allow us to examine
the influence of gender ideology on couples’
responses to unemployment. The absence of
data on gender ideology only matters in terms of
our results if these attitudes are time-varying. If
gender ideologies are consistent over time, these
effects will be absorbed into the fixed effects and
our estimation will be unbiased. There is some
evidence, however, that gender ideology is not a
time-invariant trait for individuals (Davis, 2007;
Fan & Marini, 2000). Thus, we consider three
cases whereby a relationship between gender
ideology, job loss, and housework could occur
and discuss their implications. First, we could
suppose the experience of unemployment would
change an individual’s gender ideology (see Fan
& Marini for a similar idea), which would have
a subsequent impact on time in housework.
This is not problematic for our study because
in this case gender ideology is a mediating
variable but not an omitted variable. Therefore,
we would not want to control for it for the
same reasons we do not control for mental
health or income. Second, we could suppose
a change in gender ideology leads to a job loss.
Although possible, this seems unlikely. Third,
an individual could have a change in gender
ideology that results in quitting a job. This
is possible, and this is why it is important to
examine how involuntary changes in labor force
participation affect time in housework. This
case would also explain why the coefficients
for our out-of-the-labor-force results were larger
than the coefficients for unemployment. The
absence of a gender ideology measure, however,
does prohibit a study of either the mediating or
the moderating influence of gender ideology on
spouses’ responses to job loss.
DISCUSSION
In this study we have taken a closer look at
the relationship between unemployment and
couples’ divisions of household labor using
a large sample of couples followed over an
extended period. Our results indicate that, at
base, both men and women act rationally in
the face of unemployment. Both unemployed
husbands and unemployed wives increase their
time in housework during the period of unem-
ployment as compared to periods when they are
employed; spouses of unemployed individuals
decrease their time in housework during the
unemployment period. Thus, we see evidence of
a reallocation of housework in the direction of
the unemployed spouse, consistent with both the
time availability and relative resources theories.
Furthermore, husbands’ responses to unemploy-
ment vary with the wife’s labor force status:
Husbands whose wives are least available for
housework increase their housework time the
most.
Yet reallocation is only half of the change
that occurs within couples. The total time in
household production also increases. That is, the
increase in housework time by the unemployed
spouse is only partially offset by the decrease
in housework time by the other spouse. This
finding highlights the importance of studying
unemployment within the larger family context
rather than focusing only on shifting allocations
between spouses or the effect of an event
such as unemployment on the individual’s time
in housework. Absolute time in housework
increases within the household during a spell of
unemployment, a change that may be explained
at least in part by the loss of income the
family experiences, which reduces the ability
to purchase substitutes for housework time, a
possible mechanism that deserves further study.
At the same time, although individual couples
may respond to unemployment differently, on
average our results do not indicate a wholesale
renegotiation of household roles during unem-
ployment, perhaps because unemployment is
perceived as only a temporary position. Spouses
may only gradually reevaluate their division of
labor as time passes to assess whether it is
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reasonable under the new conditions of spouses’
time availability.
Although the increases in housework time
that we find for unemployed individuals and the
corresponding decreases in housework time by
their spouses are consistent with time availability
and relative resources, our results indicate that
even though both theories are posited as gender-
neutral, their realization is gendered. Although
unemployed husbands increase their time in
housework an average of 3 hours per week,
unemployed wives increase their time in house-
work by double that amount, an average of
6 hours per week. Our results indicate that time
availability and gender-based explanations of
the division of household labor cannot be treated
additively; rather, they are interactive: It is not
merely the case that wives do more housework
than husbands, controlling for time in paid labor,
but that wives’ time in housework increases more
rapidly with decreases in employment hours than
does husbands’.
Our results might be interpreted in paral-
lel to Brines’ (1994) theory of gender display:
She argues not that spouses’ relative resources
are irrelevant for their time in housework, nor
that gender simply operates to give wives more
housework responsibility than their husbands,
even if they have equal resources, but that
the relationship between relative resources and
housework time is conditioned by gender. But,
our results are not consistent with a gender
deviance neutralization story. We see no evi-
dence that husbands compensate for becoming
unemployed by reasserting their masculinity
through rejection of housework. Complemen-
tarily, our results provide no evidence that wives
increase their time in housework when their hus-
bands become unemployed as a way to empha-
size their own femininity and preserve their hus-
band’s masculinity. On the contrary, husbands
increase their time in housework during unem-
ployment, whereas their wives decrease their
time in housework. These results hold whether
we use absolute housework hours as Brines
(1994) used or the relative share of housework
each spouse provides as Greenstein (2000) used.
Thus, our key findings are twofold. First,
during periods of unemployment there is a real-
location of housework in the direction of the
unemployed spouse as theory suggests should
be true. Equally, if not more important, there
is an increase in the total amount of house-
work within the household. This increase in total
household production is substantial as a fraction
of changes in housework magnitude. Unem-
ployed husbands increase their housework time
by more than twice the amount that is necessary
to offset declines in their wives’ housework time.
For unemployed wives, housework increases are
four times the amount needed to compensate for
their husbands’ reductions. Thus, viewing unem-
ployment primarily as ushering in a reallocation
of housework responsibilities between spouses
is inappropriate: The larger change is in the total
amount of household production.
Second, although the pattern of increases and
decreases seen in the results is consistent with
the supposedly gender-neutral time availability
and relative resources theories of housework
division, the magnitudes of the increases indicate
that these responses are gendered, but the
results are not supportive of a gender deviance
neutralization explanation. Wives increase their
housework time during unemployment on
average at a magnitude of twice the increase
of unemployed husbands, a phenomenon that
requires further study.
Our findings suggest that we should move
away from purely individual-level or divisional
analyses in the study of housework. Just as
the added-worker literature developed in eco-
nomics to better understand the patterns of labor
force participation within the family that fol-
lowed unemployment, so too must we study the
relationship between unemployment and house-
work within the broader family context. Time
in housework is not only about the relationship
between spouses. Rather it is also about the com-
plex relationships between market labor, home
production, outsourcing, and standards of clean-
liness within the household. We hope that as data
become available for researchers to examine fea-
tures of the relationship between unemployment
and nonmarket labor during the recession at the
end of the 2000s, which produced high rates of
unemployment, they will incorporate the family
context into their studies, going beyond the level
of the individual and the reallocation-only study
of the spousal dyad.
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